Abstract
Uganda's Evidence Act, Cap 8, still carries the architecture of the statute received in 1909, yet it now operates beneath a Constitution that makes fair hearing, freedom from torture, equality and judicial independence governing legal norms rather than aspirations. This article argues that the Act requires comprehensive reform, but for a more exact reason than age or colonial origin alone. Article 274 preserves pre-1995 law only on condition that it is construed with the modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions necessary for constitutional conformity. The inquiry must therefore be provision-specific. Some inherited rules remain serviceable; others can be constitutionally read; still others contain rights-insensitive standards or leave gaps that interpretation cannot responsibly fill. The analysis corrects several common misreadings of the Act. Section 25 does not itself admit a confession obtained by torture; section 102 does not regulate expert opinion; section 118 does not exclude a witness who cannot speak; and section 89 creates a rebuttable presumption only after notice to produce. Electronic evidence is not wholly unregulated: the Electronic Transactions Act 2011 and the Computer Misuse Act 2011 already address admissibility and evidential weight. Those corrections do not weaken the case for reform. They reveal its proper foundation. The present regime is fragmented, its confession rules remain too closely tied to reliability rather than constitutional integrity, its accommodations for vulnerable witnesses are rudimentary, its expert-evidence controls are thin, and its digital rules lack a coherent authentication framework. A modern Evidence Act should therefore combine categorical exclusion of torture-tainted material with a structured rule for other rights violations, meaningful witness accommodation, transparent expert gatekeeping, technology-neutral digital proof, judicial control of public-interest claims and a disciplined review of presumptions and burdens.